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Abstract
Climate change has become one of the most pressing problems for both nature and human lives. 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are part of a “natural solution” to climate change. Most of exist-
ing MPAs are governed by government agencies rather than private stakeholders such as NGOs, 
local communities and for-profit enterprises. Nevertheless, with the global push to create MPAs, 
the number of privately governed MPAs is expected to increase. In this context, this paper aims to 
investigate the role of private stakeholders in enhancing the governance effectiveness of MPAs so 
as to improve their capability to counter any adverse impact brought by the changing climate. After 
analysis, the strengths and weaknesses of the practice of each category of private stakeholders are 
uncovered and specific recommendations are proposed to promote the future practice. With the 
increasing number of privately governed MPAs in the future, this paper serves as a starting point 
and contributes to the literature on the study of the private governance of MPAs in the context of 
the changing climate. 
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1. Introduction
Climate change has become an essential threat to both nature and human lives. In 
terms of sea areas, global warming, increased acidification and irregular weather 
patterns, interacting with many other pre-existing environmental stressors, such as 
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pollution and overharvest, have resulted in the loss of marine biodiversity and the 
increasing vulnerability and impoverishment of local communities, which are heavily 
dependent on these marine resources. In this light, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), 
which are area-based management tools, constitute part of a “natural solution” to 
climate change.1 The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has 
defined an MPA as a protected area located in marine and coastal areas with a 
“clearly defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through 
legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with 
associated ecosystem services and cultural values”.2 MPAs can mitigate the adverse 
impacts of climate change by avoiding or reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
resulting from the destruction or degradation of ecosystems, and by sequestering 
GHG emissions from the atmosphere.3 In another direction, by reducing stressors 
that amplify climate impacts and sustaining ecosystem processes and functions to 
promote resilience, MPAs can help biological systems better adapt to the changing 
climate.4 The mitigation and adaptation functions of MPAs are not entirely separate 
from each other.5 Promoting the resilience of ecosystems within MPAs may not only 
mitigate GHG emissions but also enhance the adaptation capability of ecosystems.
Effective governance of MPAs plays a crucial role in enhancing the resilience of 
ecosystems.6 In general, governance can be defined as “the process of decision-mak-
ing and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)” and 
divided into diverse levels, including corporate, national, regional and international, 
and used for various purposes such as environmental protection, peacebuilding and 
food security.7 The core characteristics of good governance include “participation, 
rule of law, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and effi-
ciency, accountability and strategic vision”.8 When it comes to environmental gover-
nance, sovereign States and intergovernmental organizations composed of sovereign 
States have been at the centre of governance since the creation of an international 
environmental agenda in the early 1970s.9 Yet, the idea that States are merely one 
type of actor among many, and the shift towards greater involvement of non-State 
actors have emerged as a result of changing conceptions of the relationship between 
politics and the market, and State and non-State actors.10 This ideational shift, as 
commented by the European Environment Agency, 
is widely assumed to have progressed through several stages, starting in the 1970s with the 
rise of neoliberal thinking in politics and economics, progressing in the 1980s with large-scale 
political reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom, and expanding worldwide in 
the 1990s with the adoption of liberalising policies by an ever growing number of developing 
countries.11
Consequently, the concept of governance has broadened to include a growing num-
ber of non-State actors operating at different levels outside the narrowly defined 
State-centric realm.12 This evolving concept of governance also applies to MPA gov-
ernance. Accordingly, in the context of MPAs, the essence of governance is vested 
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in actors “who hold authority and responsibility and can be held accountable for 
the key decisions for a given protected area according to legal, customary or oth-
erwise”.13 A variety of stakeholders can be involved in the governance of MPAs, 
including government agencies, non-government organizations (NGOs), local com-
munities including indigenous people, and for-profit enterprises.14
Article 192 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
obliges States to protect and preserve the environment of all kinds of marine areas, 
including territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), continental shelves and 
areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ).15 The establishment of an MPA, as an 
area-based management tool, falls inside the scope of the measures outlined in 
Article 194(5) of UNCLOS that States can take to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment, comprising “those necessary to protect and 
preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened 
or endangered species and other forms of marine life”.16 Accordingly, the rights to 
establish and govern MPAs, especially those located within a State’s territorial sea 
or EEZ, are usually vested in that State.17 Hence, government agencies are usually 
indispensable in the governance of MPAs. In fact, in contrast to land protected areas, 
most of the existing MPAs are governed by government agencies instead of private 
stakeholders. As a result, research on private protected areas mainly revolves around 
terrestrial examples, and by contrast, private governance of MPAs has gained little 
attention in scholarly discussion.18 
However, it is predicted that the number of privately governed MPAs is likely 
to expand owing to the global push to create more MPAs.19 In October 2010, the 
Conference of Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) set 
global protected area targets and extended the target deadline from 2012 to 2020, 
stating that:
By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water, and 10 per cent of coastal and 
marine areas, especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services, are conserved through effectively and equitably managed, ecologically 
representative and well connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-
based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes and seascapes.20
In a June 2017 press release, Cristiana Palmer, the Executive Secretary of the 
CBD, declared that “the world is on track to protect over 10% of the globe’s marine 
areas by 2020”.21 Despite the rapid expansion of MPAs, she reminded people that 
it is also essential to ensure that the established MPAs are governed effectively and 
fairly.22 Scholars have expressed concerns about the phenomenon of “paper parks”, 
in reference to legally established MPAs where current protection activities do not 
suffice to achieve conservation objectives.23 
Climate change exacerbates the problem of “paper parks”. As climate change pres-
sures continue to mount in the coming years, interest in and initiative to establish 
MPAs to conserve marine environment will also increase.24 Moreover, responding 
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to climate change will compound the governance costs of MPAs. Consensus has 
emerged that financial shortfall represents a significant challenge that curtails the 
capability of MPAs to halt the degradation of ecosystems.25 A survey of 79 MPAs 
in 36 countries reveals a median funding gap of 15% between current income and 
the amount required to achieve a minimum of conservation objectives, while the 
increment needed to secure ideal funding is 74%.26 No significant geographical vari-
ation in funding shortfalls is found, which means that MPAs in developed countries 
are just as poorly funded as those in developing countries. To make the situation 
worse, previous studies indicate that the cost of meeting conservation objectives in 
protected areas affected by climate change may increase by over 50% and in some 
cases by more than 100% in the future.27 As a result, MPA financial sustainability 
is expected to become an acute problem in the context of climate change.28 Such 
financing shortfalls will, in turn, be translated into management constraints and 
become an obstacle to effective MPA governance.
Public sources, mainly government budgets and foreign aid, constitute the corner-
stone of MPA funding at present.29 In addition to public sources, MPA funding can 
also come from private sources, which can be further divided into external funding 
inflows and self-generated revenues. External funding inflows include NGO grants 
and private or voluntary donations, while self-generated revenues consist of resource 
user fees, tourism charges and payments for ecosystem services.30 In most coun-
tries, public revenue is becoming increasingly more difficult to access.31 In this light, 
private sources may provide a good solution for tackling the financing shortfalls of 
MPAs.32 Integrating private governance into MPA governance can attract more pri-
vate sources of funding.
More importantly, empirical research on the governance effectiveness of 20 MPAs 
in different countries around the world indicates that employing a diversity of 
inter-connected incentives can strengthen the resilience of MPA governance, irre-
spective of the approaches adopted, which may range from government-led, to 
co-management-led, to community-led approaches.33 It follows that the diversity 
of institutions involved in governance systems are the key to resilience.34 Hence, 
the participation of private stakeholders in the governance process can enhance the 
resilience of the governance system concerned.
In this context, this paper aims to investigate the role of private stakeholders, 
which consists of NGOs, for-profit enterprises and local communities, in enhancing 
the governance effectiveness of MPAs so as to increase their capacity to tackle the 
adverse impacts of climate change. For the purpose of this research, an NGO is 
defined as “a non-profit organization that operates independently of any government, 
typically one whose purpose is to address a social or political issue”.35 Admittedly, 
there can be a whole range of different types of NGOs, for example, “from the local 
grassroots organization, via the nationally based NGO with international connec-
tions, to interest groups”.36 “NGO” as used in this paper refers to all of these types 
of organizations provided that they are involved in the process of MPA governance. 
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As to the structure, this paper first outlines an analytical framework for studying the 
role of private stakeholders. Applying this analytical framework, it then continues to 
separately examine the role of each category of private stakeholder by observing and 
reviewing selected examples of MPA governance in different countries around the 
world. The last part concludes the discussion by proposing several recommendations 
about how to incorporate private stakeholders into MPA governance in the context 
of climate change.
2. An Analytical Framework for Studying the Role of Private Stakeholders
This paper seeks to explore the role of each category of private stakeholder in adapt-
ing MPA governance to climate change. For this purpose, an analytical framework is 
proposed in this part, based on a review of related literature, mainly including case 
studies of MPA governance and discussions on the influence of private stakeholders 
in developing international environmental law.37 The details of this analytical frame-
work are set out below.
The analytical framework proposed here is mainly inspired by the methodology 
applied by Elisabeth Corell and Michele Bestsill in their study on the influence of 
NGOs on international environmental negotiations.38 In their research, Corell and 
Bestill first point out that the current literature on the role of NGOs in global envi-
ronmental politics suffers from the following three weaknesses:
First, there is a tendency to treat all studies related to NGOs in the environmental issue 
area as a single body of research. Second, there is a surprising lack of specification about 
what is meant by “influence” and how to identify NGO influence in any given arena. 
Third, most studies stop short of elaborating the causal mechanisms linking NGOs to 
international outcomes in the environmental issue area.39
To tackle these three weaknesses, Corell and Bestill propose a framework to 
gather and analyze evidence of the influence of NGOs in a systematic manner 
by: “specifying which political arena the analysis pertains to; explicitly defining 
‘influence’ and specifying what types of evidence can help indicate influence; and 
exploring the causal mechanisms between NGO activity and influence.”40 These 
three aspects have analogical implications for this research. As mentioned earlier, 
the present study focuses on the role of private stakeholders in adapting MPA gov-
ernance to climate change. Hence, it is necessary to: specify which political arena 
the analysis relates to; establish the “effectiveness” of MPA governance and specify 
how to evaluate the degree of “effectiveness”; and examine the causal mechanisms 
between the activities of each category of private stakeholder and the effectiveness 
of MPA governance.
At the outset, in terms of the political context, this analysis pertains to the pro-
cess of adapting MPA governance to climate change. In this context, the practice of 
private stakeholders aims to enhance the effectiveness of MPA governance so as to 
better adapt the MPA to new challenges brought by the changing climate. 
Xuechan Ma
340
Secondly, Peter Jones et al defines “effectiveness” as “the degree to which the 
ecological management objectives of an MPA are being fulfilled, particularly with 
regard to biodiversity and sustainable resource use”.41 In their MPA case studies, 
they measure the effectiveness of each MPA governance system according to its 
resilience,42 which refers to the “the capacity of a system to experience disturbance 
and still maintain its ongoing functions and controls”.43 The present study draws 
on this definition and measurement of “effectiveness”, considering that the concept 
of resilience, which emphasizes the ability to absorb change and disturbance in an 
adaptive manner, matches the research purpose of this paper, which focuses on the 
role of private stakeholders in adapting MPA governance to new challenges posed 
by climate change.44 To this effect, the “resilience” of an MPA governance system 
in absorbing change and disturbance adaptatively is used as a proxy for measuring 
“effectiveness”. This research does not use direct calculations of the effects of miti-
gation or adaptation to climate change to evaluate “effectiveness”, as the calculations 
of such effects rely heavily on sufficient scientific data, which is either difficult to 
access or, with respect to the MPAs studied here, currently unavailable.
Thirdly, we investigate the logical relationship between private stakeholders’ par-
ticipation in MPA governance and the effects of this participation. In this regard, the 
case study method is employed. By examining and analyzing the involvement of each 
category of private stakeholder in cases of MPA governance in various countries, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the practice of each stakeholder can be uncovered.
To sum up, this analytical framework makes possible a systematic assessment 
of the role of each stakeholder category in adapting MPA governance to climate 
change. On the basis of the evaluation, the concluding part proposes several recom-
mendations for future practice.
3. The Perspective of NGOs 
It is widely recognized that NGOs play an increasingly important role in fostering 
international responses to climate change.45 NGOs are registered at the national level 
and can be legally established as trust funds, foundations, associations or nonprofit 
companies according to specific domestic legislation.46 Due to their professional 
knowledge and political or social influence, the pivotal role of NGOs in environmen-
tal conservation manifests in a variety of ways:
they try to raise public awareness of environmental issues; they lobby state decision-
makers hoping to affect domestic and foreign policies related to the environment; 
they coordinate boycotts in efforts to alter corporate practices harmful to nature; they 
participate in international environmental negotiations; and they help monitor and 
implement international agreements.47
When it comes to the conservation of the marine environment, NGOs have taken 
an active part in influencing discussions on and setting the agenda for the estab-
lishment of MPAs.48 Apart from this, NGOs are also motivated to adopt innovative 
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approaches to achieve effective long-term governance. In this part, two examples, 
including the Chagos MPA and the Chumbe Island Coral Park, are studied in order 
to reveal the salient features and problems of NGO practice in the MPA governance 
process.
One notable example of relevance is the role of the Chagos Environment Net-
work (CEN) in the establishment of the controversial Chagos MPA. The CEN, 
as an NGO, is a coalition that comprises Kew Gardens, London Zoo, the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds, the Royal Society and the Marine Conservation 
Society.49 The Chagos Archipelago, which is located in the middle of the Indian 
Ocean and comprises a number of coral atolls, was colonized by the United King-
dom (UK) before Mauritius became independent in 1968. In conjunction with the 
move towards Mauritius’s independence, the UK government signed an agreement 
with the government of Mauritius - the Lancaster House Undertakings - which sep-
arated the Chagos Archipelago from the remainder of the colony of Mauritius and 
retained it under British control for defense purposes.50 In 2009, the CEN worked 
with other NGOs, including the Pew Charitable Trusts,51 to launch a proposal for 
the establishment of a vast marine reserve in the Chagos Archipelago.52 This MPA 
proposal prompted the UK government to start bilateral talks with the government 
of Mauritius. During these talks, the Mauritius side reiterated its concerns about 
issues relating to resettlement, access to fisheries resources, potential benefits that 
Mauritius should derive from any oil exploitation activities in or near the Archipel-
ago, and economic development of the islands in a manner which would not preju-
dice Mauritius’s future enjoyment of sovereignty.53
In 2010, with little progress in bilateral talks, the UK government initiated and 
held a public consultation on the subject of the Chagos MPA. Three options were 
presented to the public: (1) “a full no-take marine reserve for the whole of the territo-
rial waters and Environmental Preservation and Protection Zone (EPPZ)/Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Zone (FCMZ)”;54 (2) “a no-take marine reserve 
for the whole of the territorial waters and EPPZ/FCMZ with exceptions for certain 
forms of pelagic fishery (e.g., tuna) in certain zones at certain times of the year”;55 
and (3) “a no-take marine reserve for the vulnerable reef systems only”.56 Appar-
ently, the first option set out the strictest limitations on human activities within the 
MPA, in the sense that it declared a full no-take zone that covered a vast marine 
area. The responses from the public showed significant majority support for the first 
option. Consequently, the British government adopted the first option and formally 
established the Chagos MPA on 1 April 2010. Notably, the CEN also endorsed the 
first option. 57 However, in its response to the public consultation, the CEN did not 
mention the position of the Chagossian community or that of other regional stake-
holders. Being aware of Mauritius and the Chagossian groups, the CEN was of the 
view that “it is not disadvantageous to have the islands and their marine areas pro-
tected in their entirety now, since arrangements could be modified if circumstances 
changed”.58
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Despite its intention to preserve the marine environment, establishment of the 
Chagos MPA has been subject to criticism pertaining to the insufficient involve-
ment of local communities in the consultation process. It has been criticized that 
little attention was paid to the rights and interests of local communities, including 
the right of Chagos Islanders to return to the Archipelago.59 Consequently, Mauri-
tius initiated arbitration against the UK, claiming that the latter was not entitled to 
establish the Chagos MPA according to UNCLOS and other rules of international 
law.60 Though the arbitral tribunal considered that it lacked jurisdiction to address 
whether the UK had the right to establish this MPA,61 it decided that the manner in 
which the MPA was declared violated Articles 2(3), 56(2), and 194(4) of UNCLOS, 
stating that:
(1) that the United Kingdom’s undertaking to ensure that fishing rights in the Chagos 
Archipelago would remain available to Mauritius as far as practicable is legally binding 
insofar as it relates to the territorial sea; (2) that the United Kingdom’s undertaking 
to return the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius when no longer needed for defence 
purposes is legally binding; and (3) that the United Kingdom’s undertaking to preserve 
the benefit of any minerals or oil discovered in or near the Chagos Archipelago for 
Mauritius is legally binding.62
Another criticism is that despite the vital role that the CEN played in establishing 
the MPA, the extent to which the CEN will continue to contribute to the long-
term monitoring and enforcement of the MPA remains to be seen.63 This concern 
is not groundless. According to Elizabeth De Santo’s observations, well-financed 
efforts made by NGOs tend to focus on MPA establishment rather than on effective 
long-term governance owing to the fact that “it can be difficult to convince NGOs 
and their donors of the need to fund the ongoing management and monitoring of 
PPA [Private Protected Area] arrangements, and not just their acquisition and/or 
establishment”.64
Furthermore, apart from establishing MPAs, successful efforts to adopt innovative 
approaches to effective long-term governance have been made by some NGOs. An 
illustrative example is the Chumbe Island Coral Park (CHICOP), an MPA estab-
lished in Zanzibar, Tanzania and the first in the world to be privately governed.65 
In 1993, the Government of Zanzibar (GoZ) leased the land area on the island 
for a period of 33 years to Chumbe Island Coral Park Limited (CHICOP Lim-
ited), which is a nonprofit company established with a specific purpose to “develop a 
financially sustainable model of MPA management through revenue generated from 
ecotourism”.66 In 1994, the GoZ entrusted the management of the MPA through a 
management agreement to CHICOP Limited for a renewable ten year period.67 The 
CHICOP is a no-take area where only non-consumptive and non-exploitative activi-
ties are permissible.68 The governance effectiveness of this MPA has turned out to be 
at a very high level. In an empirical study conducted by Peter Jones et al in 2011 of 
MPA governance among 20 MPAs located in different countries around the world, 
CHICOP ranked first.69
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Several measures or solutions have contributed to the success of the CHICOP. 
First of all, the governance of CHICOP involves a wide range of stakeholders. An 
advisory committee was set up in 1995, which consists of two representatives from 
CHICOP Limited, four from different departments of the GoZ, four from neighbor-
ing fishing villages and one from the research community.70 Though recommenda-
tions made by the advisory committee do not bind CHICOP Limited, the advisory 
committee meetings, which are held at least twice a year, provide a formal forum 
for diverse stakeholders to get informed about and to voice their opinions on issues 
relating to management plans and project progress. Besides, village meetings with 
local communities adjacent to the CHICOP began in 1991 and have continued 
thereafter.71
Secondly, potential adverse impacts on the livelihoods of local communities have 
been overcome by employing people from nearby communities to work in the park 
and offering local communities other income opportunities such as “a regular mar-
ket for food, building materials and handicrafts, outsourcing road and boat transport 
and craftsmen services during maintenance”.72 It is noteworthy that the CHICOP’s 
operations are labor-intensive because of the particular eco-technologies chosen, 
thereby providing more job opportunities and promoting the sustainable economic 
development of local communities.
Thirdly, marketing the CHICOP as a prime ecotourism destination through inno-
vative channels including winning international environmental awards, gaining rec-
ognition by the international conservation community, targeted marketing over the 
Internet and cooperating with travel agents and tour operators, results in an increase 
of the revenue generated from ecotourism. The revenue is reinvested in covering the 
management costs and supporting environmental education programs.73 Besides, 
CHICOP Limited saves management costs by recruiting volunteers for professional 
assistance.
Fourthly, by offering environmental education to government officials, local com-
munities, employees in the park, school pupils, tourism operators, visitors and the 
general public, the CHICOP raises public awareness on the importance and vulner-
ability of the marine ecosystem, which, in turn, enhances public support of this MPA 
governance project.74
Fifthly, CHICOP Limited has prioritized baseline surveys, and monitoring and 
research programs, which has not only helped establish the conservation value of the 
area but also proven valuable in aiding the MPA management.75
Despite previous good practice, CHICOP still faces several challenges. Though 
the land lease and the management contract are renewable upon expiration, CHI-
COP Limited has no legal assurances about renewal and must renegotiate each 
renewal with the GoZ.76 Moreover, the Zanzibar Investment Promotion and Protec-
tion Act of 2004 offers limited protection against the expropriation of the MPA by 
the GoZ, stipulating that interests or rights of investors might be expropriated in the 
presence of fair and adequate compensation according to Article 17 of the Zanzibar 
Xuechan Ma
344
Constitution, namely “for defence and security of the people, health requirement, 
town planning and any other development in the public interest”.77 To this effect, the 
risk remains that this MPA might be expropriated for purposes of economic develop-
ment. Other challenges relate to the financial sustainability of the MPA governance. 
The GoZ has adopted policies to encourage ecotourism and non-commercial work 
such as tax exemptions and reduced land lease charges. However, these policies are 
rarely implemented, which has been a source of conflict between the GoZ and the 
management team of CHICOP for years.78 Last but not least, the most severe threat 
to CHICOP’s economic sustainability is its heavy dependence on revenue generated 
from ecotourism in an international market that is sensitive to political turmoil, nat-
ural disasters and other risks.79
The above observations reveal that while most NGOs focus on the establishment 
of MPAs, some innovative NGOs have made efforts to promote MPA governance 
efficiency in the long term. The primary advantage of governance dominated by 
NGOs is that they can provide transformative frameworks for integrating various 
stakeholders by creating channels for the flow of information, structures for decision- 
making and forums for discussion.80 In contrast with government-led governance, 
NGOs have to build up a cooperative relationship with other stakeholders in order 
to gain legitimacy and public support. In contrast with the competing services 
offered by for-profit enterprises, NGOs tend to be more trustworthy owing to legal 
constraints on the distribution of profits and their focus on environmental protec-
tion and conservation.81 Consequently, the involvement of NGOs can significantly 
enhance the effectiveness of governance by involving direct stakeholders, including 
government officials, local communities and tourism operators, into the governance 
process.
However, it has to be noted that NGOs alone provide no substantive guarantee 
that benefits will be widely distributed and that conservation goals will be pursued.82 
As shown by the Chagos MPA case, insufficient involvement of local communities 
and inadequate attention paid to their rights and interests may pose a challenge to 
the legitimacy of MPA governance.83 The Chagos MPA is not an isolated case. In 
2003, Honduras designated the Cayos Cochinos as an MPA and entrusted respon-
sibility for conservation to the Honduras Coral Reef Fund (HCRF). In 2004, WWF 
assisted HCRF in developing a management plan that claimed to take into account 
the participation of the local community, namely the Garifuna people. Nevertheless, 
the Garifuna still felt victimized owing to significant restrictions imposed on their 
fishing activities and little community participation in the decision-making process.84
Meanwhile, conservation goals cannot be achieved without the support of gov-
ernment agencies. As discussed above, governance efficiency at CHICOP still faces 
challenges owing to insufficient laws and policies and failure to implement relevant 
laws and policies meant to favor NGOs on the part of the GoZ. Besides, the eco-
nomic sustainability of NGO-led governance is highly sensitive to fluctuations in 
the international tourism market. One author has suggested that an international 
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insurance scheme could be established to help MPAs, especially privately governed 
MPAs, to buffer severe income loss from visitor fluctuations.85
4. The Perspective of Local Communities
Community-Based Management (CBM) is a bottom-up approach with the aim of 
incorporating local communities into the decision-making process in MPA gover-
nance.86 With the trend of decentralized environmental governance owing to the 
failure of the traditional government-led governance, CBM has become more com-
mon in both developed and developing States, as well as in both land-based and sea-
based protected areas since the 1980s.87 Nevertheless, the success of CBM projects 
varies widely. A number of previous studies have explored factors that influence the 
outcome of the CBM approach. For instance, Lindsey Wood concludes that clear 
land tenure, strong local institutions and interdisciplinary cross-scale linkages are 
three critical determinants of the success of the CBM approach.88 A few scholars 
go further and question the significance of participatory democracy in the context 
of developing countries, because of the lack of transparency in the CBM approach, 
especially in the unequal distribution of economic profits, which usually serves to 
heighten tensions rather than achieve conservation goals.89 In this light, this part 
intends to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the CBM approach in the 
context of MPA governance.
The Seaflower MPA in Colombia is an illustrative example of the CBM approach. 
This MPA, as the first and largest MPA in Colombia, is managed by CORALINA, 
a regional autonomous government agency with authority over the environment of 
the San Andres Archipelago. The Seaflower MPA, located on San Andres Island, has 
been legally divided into zones designated for: (1) artisanal fishing; (2) non-entry; 
(3) no-take; (4) special use (activities that are required to achieve MPA objectives, 
including ports, shipping lanes and cruise-ship anchorage); and (5) general use. 
CORALINA collaborates with local communities in MPA governance, including 
indigenous islanders known as raizales. Local communities have final decision-making 
power in the MPA design. The consensus reached between CORALINA and 
local communities was recorded in formal agreements and subsequently enacted 
in law.90
This MPA has gained strong support from local communities owing to a high 
degree of involvement and participation in the governance process by these same 
communities. However, the primary challenge facing Seaflower is the lack of finan-
cial resources and enforcement support.91 First of all, since Seaflower has a weak 
nexus with the national government, the MPA receives no direct government fund-
ing, which has curtailed its ability to achieve environmental conservation and sus-
tainable development objectives.92 Secondly, given that Colombia and Nicaragua 
used to dispute the Seaflower MPA waters, Colombia withdrew its navy vessels from 
this area as part of its litigation strategy to avoid conflict escalation, which resulted 
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in an increase of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing undertaken by 
foreign fishing vessels in the region.93 Though the Seaflower MPA waters are no 
longer in dispute after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delimited a maritime 
boundary between the two States in 2012, it remains to be seen whether Colombia 
will deploy a military presence in the region to enforce the environmental legislation 
protecting the MPA, as Colombia and Nicaragua still have maritime disputes in an 
area not far from the MPA.94
Moreover, a crisis occurred in 2010 when the national government leased two 
blocks located within the Seaflower MPA to oil companies for oil exploration fol-
lowed by exploitation. In response, CORALINA submitted a Popular Action, which 
was “a legal instrument granted to Colombians that allows them to seek protection 
of collective rights and interests related to their homelands, environment, and other 
interests”, to halt oil exploration.95 Under public pressure, the president of Colom-
bia finally announced that the national government would revoke the leases and not 
carry out any oil exploration and exploitation within this MPA. 
Apart from this incident, the lack of support by the national government also 
causes other problems. The population density in San Andres Island has been 
increasing due to the absence of national support to help deal with migration and 
population control issues. These external issues, including a high and continuously 
increasing population density, have caused significant pressure on ecosystems and 
resources within the Seaflower MPA. As a result, despite the establishment of the 
MPA, results of scientific research and monitoring reveal that the condition of most 
marine natural resources has not improved or even become worse in some cases.96
The preceding analysis indicates that the involvement and participation of local 
communities can increase their commitment and confidence in the MPA concerned. 
However, lack of support by the national government poses a significant challenge 
to effective implementation of MPA governance owing to both insufficient technical 
and financial resources and the incapability of dealing with external issues such as 
migration and population control.
Furthermore, distinctive from other private stakeholders, a unique issue that 
governance dominated by local communities may face is resistance to conserva-
tion objectives for cultural reasons. The governance of the Wakatobi National Park 
(WNP) in Indonesia serves as an example for discussion. The Bajau people are heav-
ily dependent on the marine environment of the MPA for food, fuel and building 
materials.97 The Bajau see themselves as outsiders in Indonesia due to social and 
economic marginalization. As one of the most impoverished populations in Indo-
nesia, the Bajau have a fundamentally different perception of marine resources 
compared to the rest of Indonesian society. The Bajau perceive marine resources 
as existing for exploitation and usage rather than conservation.98 This perception 
reflects their “predominantly subsistence lifestyle and distinct cultural and spiritual 
views regarding fish stocks and their abundance”.99 Hence, the Bajau have shown 
little support for the conservation objectives of the MPA and prefer to maintain their 
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unique identity by abstaining from participating in any official government initiative. 
Besides, it is difficult for this community to adapt to alternative livelihoods provided 
that fishing is central to almost all aspects of the Bajau culture and lifestyle.
With the continuance of these cultural stereotypes and resistance, it can be pre-
dicted that the Bajau’s participation in MPA governance will remain negligible, and 
poverty will continue to increase, inevitably undermining the effectiveness of gov-
ernance at the WNP. Based on this, one author comments that injustice will persist 
provided that “these programs are based upon a predominantly protectionist notion 
of ‘conservation’ rooted in Western scientific thought”.100 This comment underlines 
the importance of taking into account the culture and economic livelihoods of local 
communities instead of merely implementing conservation objectives based on scien-
tific evidence. Nevertheless, harmonizing or balancing cultural imperatives with con-
servation goals remains a problem that warrants further attention and investigation.101
5. The Perspective of For-Profit Enterprises
The establishment of MPAs reallocates the rights and obligations of various stake-
holders, especially local communities. Considering that harvesting marine resources 
including fishing usually constitutes the primary livelihood of local communities, 
MPA governance needs to consider compensation or alternative livelihood options 
for local communities since the displacement of rights to access marine natural 
resources may cause short-term hardships to these communities.102 In addition to 
directly employing the people from local communities to work at the MPA, the most 
common solution that offers an alternative livelihood to local communities is tour-
ism, in the form of diving, boating, wildlife viewing, historical and cultural tourism, 
eco-tourism and even recreational fishing. The tourism business usually comprises 
the participation of for-profit enterprises, including travel agents, accommodation 
providers, restaurants, tour services, transportation and tourism-related infrastruc-
ture providers, which, in general, are referred to as “tourism-related companies” 
hereinafter. Notably, while it is uncommon in practice to have for-profit enterprises 
as de jure authorities to dominate MPA governance, they may act as de facto author-
ities that exert significant influence on MPA governance.
One notable example is the Sanya Coral Reef National Marine Nature Reserve 
(SCR-NMNR) in China. According to the 1994 Regulation on Nature Reserves, 
the SCR-NMNR is divided into three types of zones: core, buffer and experimental 
zones.103 Any extractive use of marine resources including fishing is prohibited within 
the whole SCR-NMNR. The core zones are no-entry areas, while in the buffer and 
experimental zones, non-extractive activities including ecotourism and education are 
allowed. Scholars describe the governance approach of the SCR-NMNR as “man-
aged by the government with significant decentralization and/or influences from pri-
vate organizations”, especially from tourism-related companies.104 The SCR-NMNR 
was designated by the State Council in 1990. However, in practice it was managed 
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by the Sanya Municipal Government before 2002 following decentralization reforms 
across China. Management was taken over by the Hainan Provincial Government in 
2002 due to an intensification in tourism. However, management remained heavily 
dependent on local resources, especially the tourism industry, owing to a lack of 
funding from both the central and provincial governments. Tourism development 
started in the SCR-NMNR in 1997. At present, twelve tourism-related companies 
are operating therein. Notably, tourism activities, including “diving and snorkeling, 
anchoring, sedimentation and tourism-related infrastructure development”, have 
caused damage to reef habitats and pose a significant and inadequately addressed 
challenge in MPA governance.105 Regulating these tourism activities has been difficult 
owing to resistance from local vested interests, which is understandable considering 
that tourism in this MPA has made significant contributions to the development of 
the local economy in the city of Sanya.
The situation seemed to improve when China enacted the Law on the Adminis-
tration of the Use of Sea Areas in 2001.106 This law sets out regulations on the allo-
cation of “sea user rights” in the internal waters and territorial seas of China. This 
law provides that ownership over these marine areas belongs to the State. Moreover, 
following this law, any individual or entity shall apply for “sea user rights” from the 
government if they want to enjoy exclusive use of certain marine areas for a period 
longer than three months. The law also stipulates that the competent authorities for 
approving such applications are the central and provincial governments. Lower-level 
governments, including municipal and county governments, are not entitled to grant 
“sea user rights”. In particular, projects involving the use of a sea area more than 
a certain size or major national construction projects shall be subject to the central 
government’s approval, while the power to approve other projects remains with the 
respective provincial governments.107 In 2006, a circular on “Further Strengthening 
the Administration of Sea Use Management within Marine Protected Areas” was 
issued by the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which sets forth that “sea user 
rights” within a national marine nature reserve such as the SCR-NMNR shall be 
approved by the SOA.108 
The 2001 law and the 2006 circular bring clarity to the authorization of “sea 
user rights” for tourism and other non-extractive activities within the SCR-NMNR, 
which used to be an area of competition among distinct levels of government. As a 
result, the rights enjoyed by tourism companies obtain explicit legal protection. This 
development may, in turn, motivate tourism companies to invest in the protection of 
coral reef habitats so as to benefit the long-term development of the tourism indus-
try. Moreover, the introduction of “sea user rights” and the approval procedures 
may, to some extent, help achieve a better balance of power between pro-conserva-
tion higher-level government agencies and pro-development local governments.109 
Yet, in practice, it is reported that some applicants and provincial governments agree 
to split bigger projects into several smaller projects in order to avoid the involvement 
of the central government.110
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Another point worth addressing pertains to conflicts between tourism-related 
companies and local communities. Admittedly, the tourism industry not only pro-
vides a number of job opportunities for people from the local communities within 
the SCR-NMNR, but also invests in improving public infrastructure such as roads 
and schools in villages there. Besides, tourism-related companies offer additional 
financial and human resources to the governance of the SCR-NMNR by funding 
the employment of field wardens who are in charge of patrolling and enforcing MPA 
governance. However, the rapid development of the tourism industry has caused a 
loss of community access to coastal resources. Local governments, notably respec-
tive provincial governments, may be inept at representing the interests of the local 
communities, especially in a country where local officials are usually not directly 
elected by local citizens. By contrast, for-profit companies tend to have more bar-
gaining power than local communities during negotiations with local governments, 
considering that the most important indicator for assessing and evaluating the polit-
ical performance in China is economic development. In these circumstances, tour-
ism-related companies have occupied well-developed coral reef areas, which have 
subsequently become inaccessible to local fishers. Even though tourism activities in 
these areas may lead to economic benefits, it is questionable whether local commu-
nities will be able to enjoy a proportionate share of these benefits. 
Several lessons can be learned from the experience of MPA governance at the 
SCR-NMNR. At the outset, before the introduction of a transparent legal regime on 
the allocation of “sea user rights”, governance at the SCR-NMNR was dominated 
by the local government and for-profit enterprises. This collaboration enabled, to 
some extent, the SCR-NMNR to tackle specific conflicts by offering alternative live-
lihoods to local communities as a means of halting extractive activities.
However, this governance approach is not devoid of problems. In the face of intense 
economic driving forces, tourism activities have resulted in damage to reef habitats 
and thus become a significant governance challenge. Nevertheless, the legal clarity 
on “sea user rights” introduced by legislation may partly address this challenge. After 
obtaining explicit legal protection, for-profit companies may be motivated to invest 
in the protection of coral reef habitats so as to benefit from the long-term develop-
ment of the tourism industry.
Moreover, the local communities have limited participation in the governance 
process. They are at a disadvantage when competing with for-profit companies 
for access to marine natural resources. In order to improve the participation and 
involvement of local communities, some scholars suggest that efforts need to be 
made to protect “the legitimate rights of traditional resources users, including 
the recognition of these rights and the empowerment of the holders in decision- 
making processes, and the equitable sharing of benefits from development and 
conservation”.111
Finally, it can be seen that the governance of this MPA excludes the involvement 
of NGOs. In fact, NGOs play an essential role in balancing between the governance 
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objectives of development and conservation, because NGOs are devoted to and 
competent in protecting and conserving the marine environment, which may off-
set the influence exerted by pro-development local governments and for-profit 
enterprises.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
The above observations and analysis show that all categories of private stakeholders, 
including NGOs, local communities and for-profit entities, can play a significant 
role in enhancing the effectiveness of MPA governance. NGOs are good at obtain-
ing external funding to support governance systems. They are devoted to conserva-
tion objectives and are willing to adopt and experiment with innovative approaches 
during the governance process. They may also enjoy tax benefits and government 
subsidies. More importantly, NGOs are capable of providing transformative frame-
works to integrate different stakeholders, including government agencies, local com-
munities and for-profit entities, into governance systems. Nevertheless, under some 
circumstances, NGOs may have more interest in establishing MPAs than managing 
them for the long-term, and are prone to focus more on conservation objectives 
than the sustainable livelihood of local communities. Also, the sustainability of NGO 
governance may face uncertainty as a result of ambiguous government policies. In 
addition, governance systems that are dependent on tourism revenues are sensitive 
to fluctuations in international markets.
From another perspective, governance involving a high level of participation from 
local communities usually gains strong support from these communities. Public sup-
port for the CBM approach can strengthen the capability of a governance system 
to counteract the influence of government agencies that pursue policies counter to 
MPA governance objectives. However, owing to its weak nexus with government 
agencies, especially those at higher levels, governance led by local communities can 
be subject to a lack of technical and financial support, and be incapable of dealing 
with external issues such as immigration and population control. These weaknesses 
can significantly curtail an MPA’s capability to halt environmental degradation. Cul-
tural values shared by local communities may also act as an obstacle to achieving 
conservation objectives.
Turning to for-profit enterprises, the involvement of these enterprises can con-
tribute to governance effectiveness by providing alternative livelihoods for local 
communities and sustainable financial support for MPA governance systems. 
However, for-profit enterprises may focus more on economic development than 
conservation objectives, and compete with local communities for access to coastal 
resources.
The strengths and weaknesses of the practices of each category of private stake-
holder in the MPA governance process are summarized in Table 1: 
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Table 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Practice of Private Stakeholders
Strengths Weaknesses
NGOs – Obtain sufficient external funding;
–  Provide transformative frameworks to 
integrate different stakeholders;
– Enjoy tax benefits and subsidies;
–  Adopt innovative approaches to govern 
MPAs.
–  May focus more on MPA establishment 
than the MPA governance;
–  May focus more on conservation 
objectives than the sustainable livelihood 
of local communities;
–  Are subject to uncertainty caused by 
ambiguous government policies;
–  Are sensitive to fluctuations in 
international markets.
Local 
Communities
–  Gain strong support from local 
communities;
–  Prone to obtain broad public support 
for MPA governance.
–  Lack of technical and financial support;
–  Incapable of dealing with external issues 
such as immigration and population 
control;
–  Resistance to conservation objectives for 
cultural reasons.
For-Profit 
Enterprises
–  Provide alternative livelihoods for local 
communities;
–  Provide sustainable financial support 
for MPA governance.
–  May focus more on economic 
development than conservation objectives;
–  Compete with local communities for 
access to coastal resources.
Furthermore, the preceding examples of MPA governance indicate that the desire 
for economic development usually accompanies conservation objectives. Indeed, 
these two types of interests can be harmonized in the long-term. The conservation 
of ecological systems within the MPA can pave the way for the sustainable economic 
growth generated from tourism and responsible use of marine natural resources. 
However, in the short term, local communities, for-profit enterprises and govern-
ment agencies, especially those at lower levels, are prone to place a priority on the 
pursuit of economic development, sometimes at the cost of ecosystems. In contrast, 
NGOs are more devoted to conservation objectives owing to their specific purpose 
and legal constraints on the distribution of NGO profits. To this effect, incorporating 
NGOs into MPA governance can serve to advocate for and safeguard the conserva-
tion objectives of MPA governance as well as offset the influence exerted by other 
pro-development stakeholders.
Another point worth noting is that government agencies also play an essential 
role in influencing the effectiveness of MPA governance even in those governance 
systems dominated by private stakeholders. Firstly, there are specific external issues 
such as immigration and population control that can only be solved by government 
agencies, especially those at higher levels. Secondly, government agencies can sig-
nificantly enhance the effectiveness of an MPA governance system by providing it 
with explicit and unambiguous protections in laws or policies. Thirdly, government 
agencies can implement tax benefits and subsidies to encourage NGO participation 
in local MPAs. Last but not least, since ownership of most marine areas is legally 
vested in a State, government agencies have the ultimate power to determine marine 
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spatial planning and establish of MPAs. The effectiveness of MPA governance may 
also be affected by the existence of other MPAs in neighboring areas. Thus, pri-
vate stakeholders may have to rely on government agencies to coordinate inter-MPA 
relations.112
The above analysis, in fact, echoes the empirical research on 20 MPAs men-
tioned in the first part, which concludes that diversity in the institutions/stakehold-
ers involved in governance systems are essential to enhance the resilience of MPA 
governance systems.113 The analysis in this paper is in line with this conclusion in 
the sense that: the functions of private shareholders can complement each other by 
maintaining a balance between conservation and development objectives, and mean-
while, government agencies and private shareholders can also collaborate with each 
other to achieve the effective governance of MPAs. Consequently, the ideal web of 
interconnections between stakeholders and governance objectives can be depicted 
as in Figure 1:
Figure 1. The Ideal Web of Interconnections between Stakeholders and Objectives
Notes:  The author made this figure based on the analysis above, and inspired by Note. [33]. Thick lines exhibit 
strong interconnections while thin lines represent weak interconnections. The symbol ↔ indicates a two-way 
interaction between two stakeholders. The symbol → indicates a one-way interaction with a category of stake-
holder, reinforcing a governance objective.
Several recommendations can be proposed to reinforce the interconnections 
between different stakeholders so as to enhance the resilience of MPA governance. 
Firstly, in general, it is essential to incorporate a variety of stakeholders into the gov-
ernance process. As analyzed above, different stakeholders have different strengths 
and weaknesses, which can complement each other and make it easier to tackle vari-
ous challenges such as climate change in a flexible and resilient manner. Secondly, it 
is recommended that government agencies enact laws or policies that endow private 
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stakeholders with explicit and unambiguous rights and obligations. This kind of legal 
protection, which brings security and predictability, not only promotes a balance of 
power between private stakeholders and governmental agencies, but also ensures 
that private stakeholders can develop governance plans from a long-term and sus-
tainable perspective. Thirdly, attention needs to be paid to the involvement of NGOs 
in the MPA governance process, because NGOs contribute to advocating and safe-
guarding conservation objectives and offset the influence exerted by other pro- 
development stakeholders. Moreover, government agencies are advised to encourage 
the establishment and development of locally-based NGOs, which can act as “bro-
kers” connecting local communities and larger NGOs.114 Fourthly, the economic 
interests, involvement and cultural values of local communities should be taken into 
careful consideration in MPA governance since the livelihoods and lifestyles of local 
communities are usually profoundly affected by the establishment and governance 
of an MPA. Fifthly, while the involvement of for-profit enterprises can provide alter-
native livelihoods for local communities and sustainable financial support for gov-
ernance systems, it is important to keep in mind that measures need to be taken 
to counterbalance pro-development objectives and to tackle the fierce competition 
between these enterprises and local communities for access to coastal resources.
To conclude this analysis, it should be noted that this paper does not claim to 
provide an exhaustive account of all privately governed MPAs that exist around the 
world. The selection of illustrative examples presented here is inevitably subject to 
the author’s own specialized areas of interest, but it aims to provide some insight 
into the practice of private stakeholders in MPA governance. With the number of 
privately governed MPAs expected to increase in the future, this paper serves as a 
starting point and contributes to the literature on the private governance of MPAs in 
the context of climate change.
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